Therefore, for the same reason, every other glorified eye can see Him. Reply to Objection 1. On the contrary, Of one thing there is but one substantial being. But it is evident that the bread and wine cannot be changed either into the Godhead or into the soul of Christ. The Summa Theologi of St. Thomas AquinasSecond and Revised Edition, 1920Literally translated by Fathers of the English Dominican ProvinceOnline Edition Copyright 2017 by Kevin Knight Nihil Obstat. Further, various forms of one species require various parts of matter. For this reason among animals, man has the best sense of touch. Therefore the forms of the elements must remain in a mixed body; and these are substantial forms. Reply to Objection 3. Further, what is once "in being" cannot be again "in becoming." Christ's own bodily eye sees Himself existing under the sacrament, yet it cannot see the way in which it exists under the sacrament, because that belongs to the intellect. Question. Therefore it seems to be united to the body by means of an incorruptible body, and such would be some heavenly light, which would harmonize the elements, and unite them together. The union of soul and body ceases at the cessation of breath, not because this is the means of union, but because of the removal of that disposition by which the body is disposed for such a union. I answer that, It is absolutely necessary to confess according to Catholic faith that the entire Christ is in this sacrament. Reply to Objection 3. Therefore, the glorified eye can see Christ's body as it is in this sacrament. But since the soul is united to the body as its form, it must necessarily be in the whole body, and in each part thereof. But that it is not outside the superficies of the sacrament, nor on any other part of the altar, is due not to its being there definitively or circumscriptively, but to its being there by consecration and conversion of the bread and wine, as stated above (Article 1; 15, 2, sqq.). Reply to Objection 4. Reply to Objection 1. Fathers of the English Dominican Province. 2 Treatise on the Last End (Questions 1-5) 3 Treatise on Human Acts: Acts Peculiar to Man (Questions 6-21) 4 Treatise on the Passions (Questions 22-48) 5 Treatise on Habits (Questions 49-54) 6 Treatise on Habits in Particular (Questions 55-89) 7 Treatise on Law (Questions 90-108) 77: The Powers of the Soul in General: Q. It would seem that the whole soul is not in each part of the body; for the Philosopher says in De causa motus animalium (De mot. x (Did. Objection 4. But it was said above (Reply to Objection 2) that Christ's body is compared with this sacrament not by reason of dimensive quantity, but by reason of its substance, as already stated. And since in this way no change is made in the sacrament, it is manifest that, when such apparition occurs, Christ does not cease to be under this sacrament. Thus the soul is not in a part. ii, 3) that the embryo is an animal before it is a man. But if the species be abstracted from the conditions of individual matter, there will be a likeness of the nature without those things which make it distinct and multiplied; thus there will be knowledge of the universal. A body is not necessary to the intellectual soul by reason of its intellectual operation considered as such; but on account of the sensitive power, which requires an organ of equable temperament. But each part of the human body is not an organic body. But the phantasm itself is not a form of the possible intellect; it is the intelligible species abstracted from the phantasm that is a form. Further, if Christ's body were to remain under this sacrament even until the morrow, for the same reason it will remain there during all coming time; for it cannot be said that it ceases to be there when the species pass, because the existence of Christ's body is not dependent on those species. Canonicus Surmont, Vicarius Generalis. Therefore, from the fact that the species of phantasms are in the possible intellect, it does not follow that Socrates, in whom are the phantasms, understands, but that he or his phantasms are understood. Therefore, on the withdrawal of the soul, as we do not speak of an animal or a man unless equivocally, as we speak of a painted animal or a stone animal; so is it with the hand, the eye, the flesh and bones, as the Philosopher says (De Anima ii, 1). Objection 1. Question 76. But the species of anything is derived from its form. Objection 3. Thus from the very operation of the intellect it is made clear that the intellectual principle is united to the body as its form. For our eyes are hindered from beholding Christ's body in this sacrament, on account of the sacramental species veiling it. And since knowledge is begotten according to the assimilation of the knower to the thing known, it follows that the same thing may happen to be known by several knowers; as is apparent in regard to the senses; for several see the same color, according to different likenesses. i). So the intellectual soul requires a body of equable complexion, which, however, is corruptible by force of its matter. And therefore it is manifest that the entire Christ is under every part of the species of the bread, even while the host remains entire, and not merely when it is broken, as some say, giving the example of an image which appears in a mirror, which appears as one in the unbroken mirror, whereas when the mirror is broken, there is an image in each part of the broken mirror: for the comparison is not perfect, because the multiplying of such images results in the broken mirror on account of the various reflections in the various parts of the mirror; but here there is only one consecration, whereby Christ's body is in this sacrament. For the same essential form makes man an actual being, a body, a living being, an animal, and a man. Is the body of Christ in this sacrament locally? A proof of which is, that on the withdrawal of the soul, no part of the body retains its proper action; although that which retains its species, retains the action of the species. Theol.Imprimatur. Reply to Objection 3. Now the accidents of Christ's body are in this sacrament by means of the substance; so that the accidents of Christ's body have no immediate relationship either to this sacrament or to adjacent bodies; consequently they do not act on the medium so as to be seen by any corporeal eye. If, therefore, the whole soul be in each part of the body, it follows that all the powers of the soul are in each part of the body; thus the sight will be in the ear, and hearing in the eye, and this is absurd. Reply to Objection 2. Some, however, tried to maintain that the intellect is united to the body as its motor; and hence that the intellect and body form one thing so that the act of the intellect could be attributed to the whole. The principal work of St. Thomas Aquinas, the Summa Theologica is divided into three parts and is designed to instruct both beginners and experts in all matters of Christian Truth. But that which appears under the likeness of flesh in this sacrament, continues for a long time; indeed, one reads of its being sometimes enclosed, and, by order of many bishops, preserved in a pyx, which it would be wicked to think of Christ under His proper semblance. Therefore it is impossible that the entire Christ be contained under this sacrament. We must therefore say either that Socrates understands by virtue of his whole self, as Plato maintained, holding that man is an intellectual soul; or that intelligence is a part of Socrates. Thirdly, this is shown to be impossible by the fact that when one operation of the soul is intense it impedes another, which could never be the case unless the principle of action were essentially one. For that part which is the organ of a nobler power, is a nobler part of the body: as also is that part which serves the same power in a nobler manner. Further, the truth ought to correspond with the figure. Therefore the intellectual soul may be compared to the body animated by a sensitive soul, as form to matter. It was this argument which seems to have convinced those who held that Christ's body does not remain under this sacrament if it be reserved until the morrow. Objection 2. Therefore by the coming of the accidental form a thing is not said to be made or generated simply, but to be made such, or to be in some particular condition; and in like manner, when an accidental form is removed, a thing is said to be corrupted, not simply, but relatively. Evang. Hence since it is seen in its proper species, and is adored in heaven, it is not seen under its proper species in this sacrament. And the higher we advance in the nobility of forms, the more we find that the power of the form excels the elementary matter; as the vegetative soul excels the form of the metal, and the sensitive soul excels the vegetative soul. Thus are all other consecrations irremovable so long as the consecrated things endure; on which account they are not repeated. Further, if the whole soul is in each part of the body, each part of the body is immediately dependent on the soul. Therefore the intellectual principle is the form of man. For Augustine says (De Qq. However, it would be possible to distinguish my intellectual action form yours by the distinction of the phantasmsthat is to say, were there one phantasm of a stone in me, and another in youif the phantasm itself, as it is one thing in me and another in you, were a form of the possible intellect; since the same agent according to divers forms produces divers actions; as, according to divers forms of things with regard to the same eye, there are divers visions. But the intellectual soul is incorruptible; whereas the other souls, as the sensitive and the nutritive, are corruptible, as was shown above (I:75:6). Further, a link between two things seems to be that thing the removal of which involves the cessation of their union. viii (Did. This is heretical; for it would do away with the distinction of rewards and punishments. It is separate indeed according to its intellectual power, because the intellectual power does not belong to a corporeal organ, as the power of seeing is the act of the eye; for understanding is an act which cannot be performed by a corporeal organ, like the act of seeing. Augustine denies a plurality of souls, that would involve a plurality of species. Objection 2. It seems that the body of Christ, as it is in this sacrament, can be seen by the eye, at least by a glorified one. Others said that the soul is united to the body by means of a corporeal spirit. There remains, therefore, no other explanation than that given by Aristotlenamely, that this particular man understands, because the intellectual principle is his form. Further, since the form is the principle of the species, one form cannot produce a variety of species. Therefore it is impossible for the entire dimensive quantity of Christ's body to be there. For this reason Aristotle, Metaph. No angel, good or bad, can see anything with a bodily eye, but only with the mental eye. But this is impossible, because the various forms of the elements must necessarily be in various parts of matter; for the distinction of which we must suppose dimensions, without which matter cannot be divisible. Objection 3. Because, to be in a place definitively or circumscriptively belongs to being in a place. Therefore Christ's body is in this sacrament as in a place. It seems that Christ's body is in this sacrament as in a place. Objection 3. A sign of which is that we observe "those who are refined in body are well endowed in mind," as stated in De Anima ii, 9. Is the entire Christ under each species of the sacrament? From which it is evident that the dimensions of the bread or wine are not changed into the dimensions of the body of Christ, but substance into substance. Summary of question number right from the first part of the second part. Number follows division, and therefore so long as quantity remains actually undivided, neither is the substance of any thing several times under its proper dimensions, nor is Christ's body several times under the dimensions of the bread; and consequently not an infinite number of times, but just as many times as it is divided into parts. But the materiality of the knower, and of the species whereby it knows, impedes the knowledge of the universal. 2 - The Existence of God (Three Articles) Question. 76. Objection 2. And if to this we add that to understand, which is the act of the intellect, is not affected by any organ other than the intellect itself; it will further follow that there is but one agent and one action: that is to say that all men are but one "understander," and have but one act of understanding, in regard, that is, of one intelligible object.